The international discourse on the way ahead as regards Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, its threatening spread west- and southwards and its real and potential strategic links to America’s (and Israel’s) war with Iran has now, after a series of moves and counter-moves in the Black Sea theatre this summer, identified added reasons to again focus attention to this theatre where the net outcome of these moves now gives rise to some hope that talks and limited ceasefire could be feasible – if so perhaps a first in the larger, devastating Russia-Ukraine war.
A key to an understanding of the strategic dynamics of the Black Sea theatre lies in the economic dependence – if to varying degrees – of both Russia and Ukraine on the Black Sea (and the Turkish Straits) as the essential route for exports to (needing) global markets of their main agricultural products and fertilizers. We remember that this mutual dependence led, in July 22 2022, some five months after the start of the war, led the parties under Turkish and UN mediation, to enter an agreement, The Black Sea Grain Initiative, which provided for a corridor of safe exports from specified ports and for monitoring by an Istanbul-based Joint Coordination Centre staffed by officials from the four contracting parties, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the UN. The exports under this agreement, welcomed not least by importing countries such as those in the Horn of Africa, helped lower global food prices and stabilize international food security markets. We remember also that these steps coincided in time with hopes for peace connected with ongoing peace talks in Istanbul, both processes boosting Turkey’s aspirations for a lead mediating role.
The Grain Initiative however survived only one year, until July 2023, as a result of Russia’s refusal to renew the deal, Russia complaining at unfair insurance and sanctions conditions. After that Ukraine, with the support of friendly littoral states, opened up its own Maritime Corridor with considerable difficulty, and was gradually able through these means to approach grain deal export levels, in parallel with repeated Turkish and UN attempts over the years to achieve a return to the Initiative.
Taking one step back, the general strategic scene as regards the Black Sea in later years can be discussed in Hegelian terms of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis.
The thesis, then, is the prevailing initial Russian dominance through its powerful Black Sea Fleet with surface ships and submarines all capable to bombard Ukrainian cities with its missile arsenals, Kalibr and others – as against the Ukrainian side deprived since the Kremlin-dictated loss of Crimea and its main naval port Sevastopol of any navy, at all. However, in this initial situation of Russian superiority, a limiting factor was the 1936 Montreux Convention and Turkey’s early decision (as guardian of the convention) in the war to invoke article 19 in the convention which authorizes Turkey to close the straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) in case of war between littoral states to any and all military passage, whether it concerns the warring parties or any other country, including Russia but also NATO countries. For Russia this meant, in the near-total absence of naval reinforcement possibilities, gradual erosion of its initial naval superiority.
And then the anti-thesis, Ukraine’s remarkable build-up, with Western support, of land-based anti-ship systems, drones and missiles (e.g. Neptune and “Long Neptune”), gradually pushing back – and spectacularly sinking – key Russian naval assets, and this to an extent that Western analysts, gloomy at the war status along the land frontiers, started to talk about the Black Sea theatre as a Ukrainian success story, in comparison. Nowadays, accordingly, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is confined to roughly a quarter of the sea (a coastal strip off the Caucasus) with the mainland port Novorossiysk as its only functioning base, at least until Ukrainian bombings recently.
And now for the “synthesis”, the moves this summer by both parties (mutual bombardment offensives against key assets) leading to a situation of mutual denial that dramatically affects key exports and, thus, perhaps provides incentives for peace talks and at least limited ceasefire.
During an eventful late summer, what happened is that on the one hand Ukraine has pursued its maritime offensive, including missile and drone strikes on 8-9 September severely damaging four out Russia’s ten cruise-missile carriers whereas and has closed the Kersh Strait into the Azov Sea, whereas, on the other hand, Russia has responded by launching drone and missile barrages that have closed the deepwater ports of Greater Odessa since late July.
These military exchanges have made exports collapse – on both sides. Ukraine’s seaborne grain capacity fell from about 7 million tons a month to some 0.6 million after 22 July, and August exports this year were down 76% compared to last year. And Russia is reported to have lost roughly a quarter of its wheat export after events in July-August: the closure of the Kersh Strait, the destruction of the Taman terminal and the suspension of Novorossiysk’s three grain terminals. So in spite of Ukraine’s strategic advances, the result of Russia’s new kind and degree of responses in the ongoing air (and sea) war, it seems that a situation of “terror balance” or, rather, mutual denial has emerged, shaping anew a sense of common interest between the parties and fresh incentives for mediators, Turkey and others.
No big surprise, accordingly, that diplomacy over the Black Sea arena has taken on some momentum. On August 14, Ukraine proposed, via a third party, a mutual halt to attacks on civilian ships and port infrastructure, US vice president Vance separately asked Kyiv to pause attacks on certain tankers, and Egypt, India and Turkey outlined options to restore safe merchant navigation, among some initiatives. In addition, US foreign secretary Rubio has stated recently that both sides have expressed interest in a limited ceasefire covering grain and energy, whereas team Witkoff and Kushner has shuttled the region with new Ukrainian proposals, to which, reportedly, the Kremlin has declared “openness”, albeit non-committal.
So may be, just may be, we are indeed witnessing a process towards some sort of peace, or ceasefire, arrangement in this crucial war theatre, in this case apparently based on mutually recognized economic necessity, in conjunction with the pressure from the UN and other representatives of the dire global demand for Russian and Ukrainian delivery of essential food stuff, and the pressure from Turkey and others concerned with regional security.
Whether this could in turn pave the way for progress in the efforts to end the wider Russia-Ukraine war is of course another matter, entirely.
Michael Sahlin