The Trump/Netanyahu war of choice against Iran and its contested regime has arrived, after a full month of large-scale but inconclusive warfare, at a point of no return, literally a dead end with apparently only bad options offered to the uniquely bellicose duo: face all the known and unknown hazards of further escalation, including adding ground troops to the hitherto air campaign, in the hope to achieve internationally credible “victory” as a means to justify this war of choice, internationally and domestically, or surrender to the risks and difficulties and seek an off ramp and some kind of negotiated compromise outcome, even at the risk of huge prestige loss. Knowing that both options involve drastic implications for the world economy and hence bad, potentially very bad, omens for both leaders, Trump and Netanyahu, before upcoming elections, mid-terms in the US, parliamentary in Israel.

The current, now month-long, war between the Iranian “ayatollah” regime (or what is left of it, perhaps it is now time to say “ICRG regime”?) and the combined Trump regime of the US and the Netanyahu regime in Israel is in several ways extraordinary, historically and structurally, as will be noted henceforth by generations of historians and analysts. For rarely has an inter-state war with such unconvincing and variable justifications had such wide and unforeseeable consequences. Hence, inter alia, the emerging international consensus in labelling the current conflict as (indeed) a war of choice, not a “war of necessity” as per the classical distinction, although the argument in the US Congress still – or already – runs high whether and to what degree (or why) the claimed “imminence” of the Iranian threat could be a credible – and legitimate – casus belli and thus allowing for presidential action without congressional hearing or approval.

A ton of debatable issue has now, a month into this extraordinary war, emerged, internationally and domestically in both the US and Israel. Let there be a brief look into these before this text takes a deep breath and enters into the big question of today: what now, given Trump’s self-inflicted choice between two difficult options, escalation or de-escalation – in a (self-inflicted) situation in which he, Trump, no longer fully owns this choice? 

One emerging international analytical discourse, given the reality that contrary to US-Israeli apparent expectation there proved to be no quick fix and early Iranian surrender but a protracted and hence uncertain war, is to compare this war with either the Bush Jr 2003 attack on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or Vladimir Putin’s February 24 2022 attack on Ukraine – or both. While emphasizing the clear differences between these two cases, analysts are finding it illuminating that both cases illustrate the importance of internationally recognized legitimacy as well as the indispensability of carefully calculating the “day after” perspectives, should the initial “shock and awe” effects peter out. The cases also illuminate the “dilemma” of deterrence, should the opponent fail – or refuse – to comply and you have to follow through on the aggression threatened, as deterrence. In brief, regarding this comparison, there seems to be broad consensus that Donald Trump – and Benjamin Netanyahu – have learned nothing from the dire lessons learned of both Bush Jr and Putin and their dire failures.

But in making this comparison – with Bush Jr and Putin – it has to be reminded that in the current Iran case there are three actors, with two (the US and Israel) responsible, once again, for the attack on the third, Iran, the latter acting in accordance with Voltaire’s (?)  famous expression: Cet animal est très méchand; quand on l´attaque il ce defend – “nasty” Iran defending itself when under attack by the US and Israel. This means that whereas it took two, US and Israel under their current incumbents, to decide that now (Feb 28) is/was the time to define Iran as an imminent threat calling for instant and massive attack, it will take three, the two plus Iran’s surviving regime, to decide if and when and how to put an end to the war, whether by continued military means or by negotiation, of sorts. This particular “tango” being a consequence of the war’s protraction, beyond a full month, and the already now fully visible global consequences of Trump’s and Netanyahu’s war of choice, albeit for some different strategic reasons.

So a “war of choice” according to an emerging international (and domestic?) consensus, in view of the diminishing credibility of Trump and Netanyahu claims for the war to be one of “necessity” with varying references to the three legs of Iranian external power, its nuclear ambitions, its missile forces and its proxies in the so-called “axis of resistance”, in addition to the claimed moral imperative to rid the Iranian people and the world of the “nasty” Iranian theocracy? Whereas the jury may still be out, pending the outcome of this conflict, as regards the struggle between the different narratives on this, “war of choice” versus “war of necessity”,  it is clear that the mere prolongation of this war – or stage 2 of last years “12 days war” – has eroded the initial claims to “necessity” in favor of the “war of choice” variety and its credibility, and this in turn raises to the fore the question “Whose choice?, Trump’s or Netanyahu’s”?

Here reference can be made to the discourse – with the jury still out here too – on whether Bibi was and is the tail that wags the dog Trump/US and whether Iran’s retaining command of the full range of missiles makes Israeli  claims for the threat to be “imminent” comparatively credible, unlike the US’. Reference should and could also be made to the issue of why, exactly why, Trump again chose to follow Netanyahu’s lead in throwing ongoing negotiations under the bus, that very day.

It has followed from factors like those above that this war is extraordinary in the sense of being uniquely weakly and vaguely justified, even compared to Bush Jr:s 2003 Iraq adventure in the post 9/11 climate and in some measure even to Putin’s ill-justified Ukraine campaign, and hence uniquely devoid of end state projections, and hence ill-prepared for the apparent global quagmire that this war-of-choice has – already – proved to cause, a quagmire resulting mainly from the unforeseen Iranian closure (first time ever) of the Hormuz strait that hurts Trump/US strategic interests much more than those of partner Netanyahu who is busy fighting Israel’s other wars against its other enemies, be they Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria, the Houthis in Yemen or Palestinians in the West Bank. While fighting his own political and juridical pre-election war of survival.

Donald Trump could have chosen to declare to the world and his domestic audience that his policy line of “power by strength” with a full display of US military muscle had enforced a “victorious” negotiating result regarding the nuclear file – this was indeed the impression conveyed at the time, and not only by the Omani moderation. But the near-agreement was confined to the nuclear issue, and hence not covering the missiles and the proxies. And certainly not the suffering of the Iranian anti-regime resistance. So not sufficient for the Israeli agenda. So why and whence the apparently sudden Trump shift, to abandoning negotiations and deterrence/coercion and instead opting for war. Whence the impulse, in complete disregard of the warned-of consequences? Could it be the irresistible temptation offered by Israeli intelligence to knock out the entire Iranian leadership, including an apparently unsuspecting Ayatollah Khamenei, in one big surprise blow?

The one-month war (which given the Bush Jr and Putin comparisons could last much longer) has proven to be extraordinary also in the way the action-reaction process (attacks and Iranian retaliation and conflict proliferation) has reshaped regional and global geopolitics and geoeconomics as a consequence of the Iranian targeting of neighboring Gulf states and de facto closure of the vital Hormuz strait, with potentially enormous global implications.

The current situation essentially is a product of the Trump/Netanyahu underestimation of Iran’s regime resilience domestically (sadly for its anti-regime majority), its national resilience against foreign aggression and its capacity to broaden the scope of the war by means of remaining retaliatory means, missiles and drones. Neither Israeli nor US forward intelligence apparently can tell how long this Iranian resilience-cum-retaliation capacity will last, adding to the difficulties now to predict the duration of the war, but the resulting duration of the war with continued Iranian aerial attacks on Israel and Gulf neighbors now manifests itself in a discourse as to the deletion of Israeli, US and Gulf state missile defense resources, with consequences in turn also for the Ukrainian war theatre. And the emerging scarcity applies both to defensive missile defense and offensive bombardment resources.

But it is clearly the Iranian first-time-ever closure of the Hormuz strait, halting some 20% of world supplies of oil and gas, and the added threat of Yemini Houthis joining the war in support of Iran and threatening a similar closure – like before – of the Bab-el-Mandeb entry/exit into the Red Sea and hence the Suez canal, that is now creating a more even playing field and giving rise to global economic havoc. The effects of Donald Trump’s (and Netanyahu’s differently rooted war aims) “mess of choice” already now, after this month of war, showing alarm signs especially across Asia but also at the fuel pumps of regular MAGA voters in the US, it is clear that Trump now finds himself in a bind, and hence his now critical choice.

Everyone sees that he, Trump, no longer has the option to simply “cut and run” after declaring victory and mission accomplished, this cannot be credibly stated with the Hormuz strait still unopened, with new threats directed at the Red Sea, with the Iran regime although severely battered still essentially intact and fighting back, with the 450 kilos of enriched Uraneum still unaccounted for and uncertainties pertaining to Iran’s nuclear readiness persisting, with no relief offered to the Iranian people, and without the consent of the Israeli partner-in-war. And some kind of status quo clearly untenable, globally and hence domestically, for in a status quo the Hormuz strait remains closed at the behest of the Iranian regime. Hence the remaining alternatives, escalate or de-escalate, both politically ties to the basic requirement, a credible “victory”, credible in terms of justifying the whole Iran adventure, domestically and internationally. For without “victory”, there can be no realistic hope for ever winning the Nobel Peace Prize as a legacy safeguard.

So how is Donald Trump seeking to handle this dilemma? What can he do?

What he currently is doing is to wrestle with mixed signals, hoping this will do, for now. One signal is to sooth global energy markets by calming messaging to the effect of trying to make believe that the US is indeed staying the original course, a time-limited expeditionary excursion of some 3-4 weeks and with limited objectives, and with claims that diplomatic talks, for that purpose, are indeed under way, albeit initially between mediating volunteer countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, not directly between the parties, whoever these are. The exchange so far, with a 15-point US “proposal” essentially asking Iranians to kindly accept total surrender, and an Iranian “counterproposal” of 5 points raising one finger and similarly maximalist in tonality, should rather not convince the energy market that a peaceful “solution” is under way, soon.

Another signal in the mix is to declare and demonstrate – using “war” Secretary Hegseth as loudspeaker – a commitment to further increasing the American military strength, including relevant ground troops, with a view to empowering the US to seek a military victory, in some shape and form. So now TV channels in the US – perhaps also in Israel, but Israel and its leader have other wars to bother about, also – are busy discussing, map-in-hand, the details of possible courses of action by thousands of newly arrived marines and air-born troops, depending on possible presidential decisions as to evolving objectives, occupation of the oil terminal Kharg or some other Persian Gulf island, and/or occupation of the Iranian Hormuz shores, and/or to use naval assets to enforce Hormuz passage, and/or to use commandos for a daring expedition to physically claim US ownership of the hidden-away canisters with enriched Uraneum. And/…?

It is obvious that in discussing this particular line of Trump messaging – whether as leverage in a hoped-for negotiation off ramp or as real preparations for a real escalation of the war, including the probability of politically controversial own casualties – discussants pay less attention to both what the role might be in such an escalation of partner country Israel, and on the extremely likely prospects of such an escalation’s further deteriorating effects on global energy supply lanes (“worse than the Pandemic situation”, say some experts on these prospects for the world economy). So, there are many unknowns, including, as the saying went, some “unknown unknowns”.

No wonder, then, perhaps, that DJ Trump, has now, in this dire situation of bad options, seen fit to ask assistance, even and not least of those whose opinion and approval he very deliberately avoided to consult before taking the war action. The GOP Congress majority, accordingly, is now asked to add a 200 billion USD war funding to the Pentagon, and previously ignored allies, in Europe/Nato and elsewhere, are now keenly invited to help solve the mess created over the Hormuz issue and beyond, Trump angrily commenting publicly on the way most such allies coldly respond to the request in a spirit of “you caused it, you solve it”, pointing to Trump’s “war of choice”, implying a burden of illegality and illegitimacy.  For now. This may well, will most probably, change, in this Trump-dominated world of Realpolitik.

To summarize, one month into Trump’s – and Netanyahu’s – highly controversial “war of choice”, given the increasing absence of convincing indicators to support the “war of necessity” narrative, in turn an vitally important ingredient in predicting what is to come and shaping the legacy, it is as difficult to predict the next few days, weeks and months in the current MENA region (even if some kind of end arrives as a result of one or several parties run out of weapons or steam) as it is clear to any and all analysts that the Iran war and the Ukraine war are connected, and increasingly significantly so. The prevailing indicators are many and varied, such as the way the Iran war has served as a distraction to a needed continued focus on Ukraine and increased questions pertaining to the Trump administration’s real goals and interests, and recent information on Russian support, via the Caspian Sea, for Iranians and Ukrainian drone/anti-drone know-how support for affected Guld states.

So, everyone should agree on the need for a quick end to the Iran war quagmire, but no one seems currently to know just how. Maybe after their now started two-week Easter recess, Congress members will return with fresh ideas. Trump seems to need those.

Michael Sahlin