Speech by Andreas von der Heide, Co-founder and CEO Consilio International AB.
Transatlantic Day 2026, 29th January 2026, Gothenburg
As delivered
We are gathered today to discuss the transatlantic relationship at a moment often described as exceptional — as if the bonds between Europe and the United States have suddenly become weaker or more uncertain.
I would like to begin by challenging that premise.
If we step back and take a 10,000-foot view, a different pattern emerges. A historical pattern in which tension, friction, and periodic irritation are not anomalies, but part of the relationship’s normal rhythm.
The United States marks its 250th anniversary this year.
Sweden and the U.S. have shared relations for almost that entire period. Over that time, the relationship has endured world wars, trade disputes, technological revolutions, and major shifts in global power. It has never been static — but it has been remarkably resilient.
This is why it is essential to distinguish between what feels new and what is, in fact, familiar.
Much of what is currently perceived as unpredictable in U.S. policy follows a deeply consistent logic.
The United States is not a traditional empire shaped by Europe’s balance-of-power system. It is a liberated colony — formed in opposition to old hierarchies, suspicious of entangling commitments, and deeply protective of its freedom of action.
When Washington prioritizes strategic autonomy, when attention pivots eastward, when the relationship with Europe becomes more transactional — this is not a break with history. It is history reasserting itself.
Geography reinforced this logic. Two oceans created distance. Distance created time. And time shaped a security culture based on selective engagement rather than permanent entanglement.
This is why American strategy has always been episodic. Reluctant engagement — followed by decisive intervention when core interests are at stake.
We saw this in both world wars. We saw it in the rejection of the League of Nations. And we see it today.
The so-called pivot to the East is not a pivot away from Europe. It is a return to first principles: preventing a hostile power from dominating Eurasia. Today, that concern is increasingly concentrated in the Indo-Pacific.
Similarly, debates around Greenland or the Arctic are not impulsive. They reflect long-standing American attention to geography, access, and strategic depth in an era where missiles, undersea cables, space assets, and critical routes matter more than ever.
And the growing American focus on technology — semiconductors, AI, energy systems, critical minerals — is not merely industrial policy. It is security policy by other means.
From Washington’s perspective, control over critical flows and system-level technologies now matters as much as traditional military power.
This is where misunderstandings often arise across the Atlantic.
Europe tends to interpret American actions through a relational lens — partnership, consultation, process.
The United States tends to act through a systemic lens — resilience, leverage, outcomes.
That does not make one side right and the other wrong. But it does explain friction.
The core point is this: the United States prioritizes systemic security over relational comfort. It always has.
And yet, this does not imply indifference toward Europe.
Historically, when the United States has intervened most forcefully, it has done so in defense of a system in which Europe was central. What has changed is not commitment to the system — but expectations of burden-sharing within it.
If American strategy is best understood through systems, then the transatlantic economy is the system where this logic becomes most visible.
Despite headlines about tariffs and disputes, the transatlantic economic space is deeply integrated. The EU and the U.S. together form the largest bilateral economic relationship in the world — not only in trade, but in investment, technology, research, and capital flows.
This matters, because friction operates at the margins of a much deeper structure: interdependence.
European and American companies are embedded in each other’s value chains. They share standards, co-develop technologies, and rely on mutual trust in ways that are difficult to unwind.
For Swedish companies, the United States is not just an export market. It is an ecosystem — where capital, innovation, scale, and risk appetite intersect.
Recent American industrial policy should be read through this lens.
It is not designed to exclude allies, but to secure domestic capacity while anchoring trusted partners into resilient supply networks.
This creates both competition and opportunity.
The question is not whether the transatlantic economy will fragment — but how it will reconfigure.
And that reconfiguration is driven by three forces: Security, technology, and alignment.
Economic policy is now inseparable from national security. Control over critical technologies defines power.
And access to markets increasingly depends on shared rules and standards.
This is where the transatlantic relationship retains a structural advantage.
Despite disagreements, Europe and the United States still operate within compatible legal and institutional frameworks. Contracts are enforced. Intellectual property is protected. Disputes are resolved within institutions — not through force.
These are not abstract values. They translate directly into lower risk and higher long-term returns.
Values, in fact, explain why the relationship endures…
At its core, the transatlantic relationship rests on shared assumptions about legitimacy, power, and responsibility — about the primacy of the individual, the constraint of power, and the rule of law.
This distinguishes, regardless of recent events in the U.S., the transatlantic system from the alternative now being offered by China.
China is not simply an economic competitor. It represents a different model of governance and a different relationship between the state, the market, and the individual.
Systemic competition today is therefore not primarily ideological in the Cold War sense. It is about which systems set the rules for the global economy.
And in that contest, values matter — not as rhetoric, but as operating systems.
As pressure from China increases, the incentives for transatlantic coordination grow stronger.
This is already visible: in export controls, investment screening, technology policy, and supply-chain resilience.
These processes are not frictionless. They raise legitimate concerns about sovereignty and competitiveness. But taken together, they point in one direction.
Strategic alignment between Europe and the United States has rarely been driven by harmony. It has been driven by necessity.
Ukraine is a case in point — and one where misunderstanding has been particularly costly.
From the first days of the war in 2022, I have argued that it was never in the United States’ interest for Russia to lose outright.
Not because Washington wished Russia to win — it did not — but because a complete Russian defeat carried two strategic risks the United States has always sought to avoid.
The first was China. A sudden Russian collapse would almost inevitably have pushed Moscow into a far deeper, more dependent relationship with Beijing — accelerating precisely the Eurasian consolidation the United States has historically worked to prevent.
The second was systemic instability. A fragmented or collapsing Russia — a nuclear-armed state with vast territory, weak institutions, and unresolved internal fractures — would have generated consequences far more dangerous than a contained, degraded adversary.
This logic explains the apparent restraint that many in Europe found difficult to accept, even as Ukraine fought for its survival — captured symbolically by President Zelensky’s words: “I need ammunition, not a ride.”
But understanding American logic does not mean endorsing its outcome.
In the long run, it is increasingly likely that the United States will look back on this approach as a significant strategic error.
By not fully enabling Ukraine to achieve a just peace on its own terms — decisively and early — Washington may have avoided short-term escalation risks, but at the cost of long-term strategic position.
What has happened instead is precisely what American strategy sought to avoid: China has emerged stronger — economically, diplomatically, and strategically — while Russia has become more dependent, more radicalized, and more dangerous.
Ukraine, meanwhile, paid the price of strategic caution with time, territory, and lives…
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And necessity is once again asserting itself.
The future transatlantic relationship will be more transactional, more negotiated, and more conditional than before. But it will also be more focused — shaped by shared exposure to the same risks, dependencies, and systemic challenges.
In such an environment, divergence becomes costly, while coordination becomes rational.
That is why the question is not whether Europe and the United States will continue to converge – They will…
The real question is whether we engage from a position of clarity rather than reaction.
For companies, investors, and decision-makers, this matters.
Convergence creates predictability. It rewards trust.
And it generates demand in areas such as energy, infrastructure, advanced manufacturing, and digital resilience.
For Sweden, this is a strategic moment…
Swedish industry combines technological depth, industrial competence, and institutional trust — qualities that become more valuable in a transatlantic system under pressure.
The opportunity, therefore, is not to shield ourselves from change, but to understand it early — and shape it.
That is the strategic opportunity of the transatlantic relationship in 2026.
Not stability without friction. But opportunity through alignment.
Let me return to where I began — the 10,000-foot view.
When we step back, the transatlantic relationship does not appear weakened. It appears clarified.
What we are witnessing is not a breakdown, but a re-sorting of priorities in a world where security, technology, and systemic competition have converged. Friction is not a sign of decay — it is the cost of operating within the same system under pressure.
The lesson from Ukraine is therefore not that alignment has failed. It is that partial alignment is not enough. Strategic hesitation carries its own price — and that price is often paid later, in a less forgiving environment.
The future transatlantic relationship will not be defined by comfort or sentiment. It will be defined by clarity: about interests, risks, dependencies, and responsibilities.
For those who engage early and honestly, convergence creates predictability. Predictability enables trust. And trust, in turn, generates opportunity — in energy, infrastructure, advanced manufacturing, and digital resilience. At Consilio International we already see many of our clients capturing those opportunities cross the Atlantic.
For Sweden, this moment matters. In a system that increasingly rewards reliability, institutional strength, and technological depth, Sweden is not on the periphery. It is well positioned — if it chooses to act with strategic intent.
The transatlantic relationship in 2026 is therefore not about preserving stability without friction.
It is about recognizing opportunity through alignment — before necessity removes the element of choice.
Andreas von der Heide