The simultaneous crises over Venezuela, Greenland, and Ukraine have exposed a fundamental cleavage in Europe’s response to American power politics. As the Trump administration explicitly articulates a “Donroe Doctrine” to justify military intervention in Venezuela and territorial claims on Greenland, European actors find themselves navigating between contradictory imperatives: preserving transatlantic unity essential for Ukraine’s survival, and defending the rules-based international order that legitimizes their own security.
This crisis reveals not one European response but two: nation-states establishing red lines through joint statements, and EU institutions searching for leverage while avoiding confrontation. Neither has produced coherent strategy, resulting in perhaps necessary ambiguity which may create further problems ahead. And important: this is an extremely public confrontation which may influence upcoming elections in several countries, all the way from US to Sweden.
Neither America nor Europa can afford to lose friends given the overall strategic perspectives ahead. The US leadership may feel powerful but power without strong allies may weaken if at the same time China and Russia gain ground in the Global South.
The Bifurcated European Response
On January 6, 2026, leaders from the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Denmark asserted that “Greenland belongs to its people, and only Denmark and Greenland can decide on matters concerning their relations.” The statement emphasized collective Arctic security within NATO while invoking UN Charter principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
This formulation represents classic diplomatic compromise: strong enough to signal solidarity with Denmark, vague enough to avoid explicitly threatening consequences. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen was more direct, warning that American military attack on Greenland would mean “the end of NATO.” Yet other signatories notably refrained from endorsing this claim, revealing fragile consensus.
The careful language masks deeper divisions. Germany’s Chancellor stated that classifying US intervention in Venezuela was “complex” and required deliberation—striking paralysis when confronted with sovereignty violations. Britain’s Prime Minister acknowledged wanting to “consult with Trump” before condemning the Venezuela operation. These hesitations suggest European powers will defend NATO allies rhetorically but remain uncertain about confronting American unilateralism substantively.
The European Commission’s response has been even more constrained. Spokespersons reiterated support for sovereignty principles but explicitly refused to draw parallels between Venezuela and Greenland. When pressed on whether the US had become an “aggressor,” one spokesperson demurred: “We haven’t really discussed how we are calling it.”
This institutional timidity reflects structural constraints—Article 42.7 obligations don’t automatically cover Denmark’s overseas territories, unanimity requirements for sanctions would face Hungarian veto, no dedicated Greenland desk officer exists—but also deliberate choice to preserve transatlantic relations. The EU characterized Maduro’s removal as “an opportunity for democratic transition” while urging “respect for international law”—a verbal contortion undermining credibility on both counts.
Public Discourse and Private Assessments
What makes this crisis complex is its dual nature: highly confidential intelligence-based discussions in European capitals, occurring simultaneously with intensely public discourse driven by Trump’s theatrical provocations and advisor amplifications on social media.
Also in Sweden, facing 2026 parliamentary elections, this tension is acute. The Foreign Minister stated Sweden “stands wholeheartedly behind our neighboring country and will always stand up for international law.” Yet Swedish security analysts worry that legally binding security guarantees like Article 5 may no longer be unconditionally valid from the American side.
This gulf between public reassurance and private assessment characterizes the broader European predicament. Officials cannot publicly acknowledge conditional American guarantees without triggering panic and emboldening adversaries. Yet they cannot ignore implications of an administration operating according to “strength, force, power… the iron laws of the world since the beginning of time.”
European Leverage: The Ukraine Card
Europe’s current primary leverage derives ironically from American priorities in Ukraine. The January 6 Paris meeting of the “Coalition of the Willing”—attended by approximately 35 nations—was designed to secure long-term security commitments for Ukraine. European leaders understand that sustainable ceasefire arrangements require European diplomatic, economic, and military engagement that America cannot provide alone.
This interdependence creates narrow diplomatic space. If Trump’s territorial ambitions cause European governments to reduce Ukraine cooperation, it undermines core administration objectives. Conversely, European willingness to sacrifice Ukrainian support to preserve transatlantic cohesion would represent catastrophic abandonment of principles and interests.
The challenge: this leverage operates asymmetrically. Europe needs American military capabilities to deter Russia far more urgently than America needs European support for Ukraine negotiations. The administration has already redeployed military assets from Eastern Europe to Latin America, suggesting Ukraine remains negotiable in ways Western Hemisphere dominance does not.
Russian and Chinese Calculations
Perhaps the most strategically consequential dimension is signal effect on Russian and Chinese calculations about their own regional spheres. As Fiona Hill noted, Russia proposed in 2019: “You want us out of your backyard; we have our own version. You’re in our backyard in Ukraine.” Trump’s explicit sphere-of-influence logic backed by military force revives this transactional framework.
Russian and Chinese responses to Venezuela have been notably restrained. Both condemned the action but issued no threats to defend Maduro. Former Russian President Medvedev offered veiled praise, noting Trump “has been rigid in defending his country’s national interests” and that the US “now has no grounds, even formally, to reproach our country.”
This restraint reflects strategic opportunism. An analyst observed that “both Russia and China want to prioritize manipulating Trump to achieve more important interests”—for China, relaxed export controls and South China Sea freedom; for Russia, favorable Ukraine settlement.
Yet the precedent creates long-term dangers. If the rules-based order’s hegemon abandons those rules for “might makes right,” other powers will follow. One expert noted America under Trump “has allowed itself to be seen as indistinguishable from China and Russia in its willingness to break rules.” This removes normative constraints on Russian and Chinese revisionism—a cost appearing only in future crises.
Scenarios Forward
Scenario 1: Managed Ambiguity
The most probable outcome is continued European ambiguity: rhetorical Denmark support combined with tacit acceptance of increased American Greenland presence. Trump likely seeks not formal annexation but expanded military basing, resource access, and effective veto power over Greenlandic foreign relations—”creeping annexation” that Denmark and Europe resist with difficulty without precipitating the NATO crisis they fear.
This preserves transatlantic relations superficially while hollowing them substantively. European governments avoid immediate confrontation but accumulate resentment and lost credibility. The rules-based order continues gradual erosion with neither clear break nor effective defense.
Scenario 2: Strategic Autonomy Accelerated
Trump’s overreach could catalyze genuine European strategic autonomy: substantial Danish defense investment in Greenland (building on the DKK 15 billion package announced in January 2026); expanded Nordic-Baltic security cooperation independent of US leadership; EU economic leverage tools applicable even to allies.
The E5 format (UK, France, Germany, Poland, Italy) and regional groupings like the Joint Expeditionary Force provide existing frameworks.
Scenario 3: Transatlantic Rupture
The darkest scenario involves Trump proceeding with coercive measures against Greenland—economic sanctions on Denmark, support for independence movements, limited military deployment—forcing European response. If Denmark invokes mutual defense provisions and major European powers provide meaningful support, it creates unprecedented alliance member confrontation.
This involves NATO fracturing, termination of critical defense agreements, and potential Russian exploitation of the rift. It represents catastrophic transatlantic relationship failure.
Conclusion: Living with Uncertainty
What emerges is not clear path but recognition that European decision-makers confront genuinely crucial choices—situations where all options carry severe costs and no solution satisfies competing imperatives.
Officials must maintain Article 5 credibility to deter Russia, preserve American Ukraine engagement, and defend inviolable borders—while managing an administration explicitly rejecting the normative framework underpinning these goals.
The distinction governments draw between Venezuela and Greenland—treating the former as regrettable but distant, the latter as existentially important—is both strategically necessary and normatively incoherent. If territorial sovereignty and international law are “universal principles” Europe “will not stop defending,” then violation venue should be irrelevant.
This incoherence hurts Europe. Either Europe develops genuine capacity and will to defend these principles—including against the United States when necessary—or it tacitly accepts return to sphere-of-influence geopolitics where its own security depends on Russian and Chinese forbearance rather than legal protections.
The coming months reveal whether European Denmark solidarity represents genuine red line or another milestone in rules-based order erosion. Russian and Chinese strategists watch carefully. Their future Taiwan, Baltic, and contested space choices will be shaped by Arctic observations.
For Sweden and smaller European powers, the imperative is clear though the path is not: simultaneously prepare for multiple futures—continued American engagement, European autonomy, or strategic solitude—without prematurely foreclosing options through either premature capitulation or futile resistance. In an age of renewed spheres of influence, uncomfortable ambiguity may be the only responsible course available.
Key Sources for This Preliminary Analysis
This article follows up on and puts a more European perspective to a parallel globala analysis published by Michael Sahlin on the KKrVA blog.
The most important additional sources for this analysis are: Eurasia Group’s Top Risks 2026 report providing the “Donroe Doctrine” framework and European weakness assessment; New York Times analysis on Russia and China’s response featuring Fiona Hill’s insights and Medvedev quotes; BBC coverage of European allies backing Denmark with the joint statement and Frederiksen’s NATO warning; EU Observer’s documentation of the Commission’s absence from Greenland defense; DW’s analysis of EU paralysis after Venezuela showing Merz and Starmer’s hesitations; Chatham House assessment of NATO threats and Article 42.7 limitations; Euperspectives’ detailed account of Commission evasions and structural constraints; New York Times coverage of Stephen Miller’s explicit “strength, force, power” doctrine; the Canada file on Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine” articulation; Notes from Poland documenting the six-nation joint statement; Sweden Herald on Swedish official position; KKrVA SV-A-R project files on public assurances and private assessments of Article 5 conditionality; Euronews coverage of the January 6 Paris Coalition of the Willing meeting; Anne Applebaum’s strategic analysis on spheres of influence; Wikipedia’s operational details on the Venezuela strikes.
Lars-Erik Lundin