The American National Security Strategy, which was published in early December 2025, has been extensively discussed since. Does it really mark a real change in international relations? Does it redefine spheres of influence in a fundamental way?
Russia has offered cautiously positive reactions, while China remains notably silent. The rest of the world grapples with the problem of understanding what the strategy may mean for how we all see the world. Is the strategy to be seen as a transactional negotiating bid, or does it really contain fundamental elements of perception that are not up for negotiation?
Moscow’s response to the strategy has been very visible. It has been praised as largely consistent with Russia’s vision of international relations. The document avoids labeling Russia as a direct threat to the United States. For the US, the strategy calls for reestablishing strategic stability with Russia, and identifies swift negotiation of an end to hostilities in Ukraine as a core American interest. This is a dramatic shift from earlier US positions characterizing Russia as a revisionist power, threatening the international order.
There is a clear connection to the notion of spheres of influence, which becomes evident when looking at the strategy’s revival of the Monroe Doctrine. It is now being termed the Trump corollary. American primacy throughout the Western hemisphere is being asserted. United States will deny those outside this hemisphere the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities in the Americas. This means a return to traditional geopolitical thinking based on regional spheres rather than universal principles.
Implicitly, no doubt this is being interpreted in Russia as offering them something similar in their near abroad. The strategy calls for the end of NATO enlargement and criticizes the way Europe is coming together. It indicates American acceptance of differentiated security zones.
This is more or less what Russia was asking for before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and most visibly heard during the visit of Foreign Minister Lavrov to Stockholm in the end of 2021. The document does not explicitly acknowledge Russian spheres of influence in Central Asia, the Caucuses or Eastern Europe. But the principle of primacy of nations and respect for sovereignty opens room for such arrangements.
Where Nixon sought rapprochement with China to counterbalance Soviet power, Trump appears to pursue improved relations with Russia. In this way, he may be hoping for being able to focus more on the China challenge and avoid that Russia forms a coalition with China. The question remains whether Moscow will accept a subordinate role in this arrangement or continue its deepening partnership with China.
Beijing’s muted response to the strategy contrasts sharply with Moscow’s enthusiasm. Its foreign ministry urges the United States to handle the Taiwan issue with utmost caution and thereby signals uncertainty regarding the permanence of the newly declared American intentions. China is known for looking for the long term, perhaps being uncertain about how long Trump and his ideas will govern U.S. policy.
The strategy is much softer on China in comparison with earlier declarations. No longer is China being characterized as having incompatible strategic visions with the U.S. Instead, the document envisions a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship and balanced trade. It commits to opposing changes to Taiwan’s status quo but avoids deeper discussion of ideology, human rights or China’s regional ambitions. Still, the question is if this posture is more tactical rather than strategic. Strategy still identifies the Indo-Pacific as crucial to American interests and commits to maintaining military capabilities to deter conflict over Taiwan.
What is really interesting is the fact that the strategy extends the notion of spheres of interest beyond geography into thematic domains. On artificial intelligence, it emphasizes that US technology and US standards, particularly in AI, biotech, and quantum computing, must drive the world forward. This represents an attempt to maintain American dominance in critical technologies, even while negotiating on other issues.
The recent decision to allow NVIDIA to sell H200 AI chips to approved customers in China illustrates the complexities involved. This suggests that the administration seeks managed competition rather than complete decoupling, potentially exchanging some technological access for other concessions, such as rare earth materials or market access.
On strategic minerals and resources, the strategy emphasizes building the world’s most robust industrial base and maintaining the world’s most robust, productive, and innovative energy sector. This extends American sphere of interest concerns to supply chains and resource access globally, not merely within the Western Hemisphere. The emphasis on reducing dependency on foreign sources for critical materials implicitly targets Chinese dominance in rare earth processing and battery supply chains.
The strategy mentions Arctic concerns primarily through its hemispheric focus than dedicating a separate section as previous strategies did. Yet actions speak louder than the document structure. The administration’s repeated interest in Greenland, shifting its command to Northern Command, and Denmark’s unprecedented identification of the US as a potential security concern, all indicate that Arctic control features prominently in American strategic thinking. Climate change has opened new shipping routes and resource access, while Russian and Chinese activities in the region have expanded. To what extent the US is willing to really negotiate with Russia and China on a shared sphere of interests in this region is very unclear.
Perhaps most striking is the strategy’s apparent retreat from America’s traditional emphasis on promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The document explicitly rejects what it calls imposing on them democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories. It criticizes OSCE and other organizations for dictating social, national, social policy and treating the transformation of domestic political life as one of its core functions. The US has indeed threatened to withdraw from the OSCE unless it stops what Washington characterizes as social engineering and focuses purely on security matters. This directly contradicts the spirit of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which established human rights as equal to military security concerns. This document has served as a cornerstone of European security architecture for half a century.
The strategy criticizes Europe as undergoing a civilizational erasure and supports what it terms patriotic European parties, signaling American willingness to work with political forces, including far-right movements that challenge liberal democratic norms if they align with other American interests. This pragmatic approach prioritizes stability and favorable relations over political ideology.
The Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine receives extensive treatment in the strategy. Beyond preventing hostile powers from establishing presence in the Americas, the strategy identifies migration control, cartel elimination, and exclusion of Chinese economic influence as core objectives.
Interestingly, there is no indication that Russia’s interest in Latin America faces more vigorous American opposition than before. Venezuelan or Cuban relations with Moscow appear less pressing concerns than Chinese port ownership, infrastructure investments, and technology penetration. This suggests American tolerance for some Russian activities in the hemisphere, provided that they don’t threaten core American interests like the Panama Canal.
The strategy’s treatment of NATO allies has generated anxiety across Europe. While it maintains formal commitment to the alliance, the document’s harsh criticism of European weakness, its demand that allies spend 5% on defense, and its emphasis on burden shifting rather than burden sharing all signal reduced American willingness to guarantee European security. Most concerning for allies is language about reconsidering partnership if European countries undergo demographic changes that make them majority non-European. It clearly positions American security guarantees as transactional arrangements requiring constant renegotiation rather than permanent commitment based on shared values.
For industries and trading companies, this strategy creates both opportunities and risks. The emphasis on rebalancing trade relationships, protecting intellectual property, and rebuilding domestic industrial capacity suggests more protectionist policies ahead. Companies dependent on Chinese manufacturing or European markets face uncertainty about tariffs, export controls, and market access. The technology sectors face a particularly difficult situation. Firms must navigate inconsistent signals on China policy while anticipating that technological advantage remains a nonnegotiable American priority. Defense contractors may benefit from increased spending demands on allies, but face questions about technology sharing and coproduction arrangements if American reliability seems uncertain.
The issue of how much is enough in terms of seeking a positive relationship with the US through sending positive signals in the direction of Washington. No one knows. If the American approach is purely transactional, there never may be an end to American demands on European concessions.
Lars-Erik Lundin