The month of October promises to be geopolitically significant. Among other things, there are pre-winter war developments in Ukraine, and a delicate balance in the Middle East between limited conflict and a potential broadening of regional war. Additionally, there is the final stage of the incredibly consequential U.S. presidential (and congressional) elections, which threaten to introduce instability should the election outcomes prove unclear or contested. At the same time, the European Union, facing unprecedented challenges, is undergoing post-election institutional changes at the Commission, Council, and Parliament levels. Election outcomes in member states such as Germany, France, and now Austria, add further complications.
In this exceptionally complex global and regional environment, two key countries, Moldova and Georgia, are approaching critical moments that will reveal real trends in the struggle between pro-European forces and their adversaries. These events are occurring in the shadow of Russia’s war in neighboring Ukraine, itself an official EU candidate. This will be a test of the EU’s current phase of enlargement, as it faces the interplay between foreign and domestic politics and policies.
Let’s take Moldova first. On October 20, there will be two separate but interconnected electoral events: a presidential election to determine whether incumbent pro-Western president Maia Sandu will receive a second mandate, and a referendum asking Moldovans if they are in favor of the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the European Union. A “yes” majority would mark Moldova’s first successful referendum on constitutional change and a formally binding, irreversible step toward EU membership. These two October events will be followed by parliamentary elections in July next year. Clearly, all three are interconnected and crucial.
Moldova’s struggle for identity and direction in recent years has been turbulent. Approximately 55% of Moldovans support the country’s EU accession (while NATO membership remains a separate and constitutionally hindered issue), yet around 41% favor an alliance with Russia, and a third identify as strongly pro-Russian. This division reflects not only the split between Moldova “proper” and the pro-Russian exclave of Transnistria (across the Dniester River, where 1,500 Russian troops remain stationed) but also opposition from politicians like Evghenia Gutul in the autonomous region of Gagauzia, near the Black Sea. Given these elements of instability, it is perhaps no surprise that Russia has directed hybrid attacks aimed at destabilizing Moldova and preventing its European trajectory, exploiting Moldova’s energy dependence on Transnistria and Russia. The list of hybrid acts since 2002 includes bomb threats, airspace violations, and fabricated political protests.
In March 2022, Moldova formally applied for EU membership, and by June, it was granted EU candidate status along with nine reform areas for the government to implement. In December 2023, after favorable commentary from the European Commission on Moldova’s implementation of these reforms, the EU Council formally decided to open accession talks. This was followed by the Commission presenting a draft framework for accession negotiations in March 2024—an impressively speedy process by any comparison.
Now, the task for the EU-oriented Moldovan government and President Maia Sandu, buoyed by EU momentum and resisting Russian rollback efforts, is to secure the support of the Moldovan people—or at least a democratically necessary majority—in this existential process. To succeed, Sandu must prevail in the presidential elections, and even more importantly, a majority must vote “yes” in the simultaneous referendum, both of which are prerequisites for a confirming vote in the July 2025 parliamentary elections. The pro-European democratic bloc must defeat the “Victory” political bloc, launched by pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor in April 2024.
It follows that the coming weeks in and around Moldova carry significant implications, not only for Moldova and the EU, but also for Russia. Serious turbulence is expected.
And then there is Georgia, a country on the EU’s mind as it nears a defining moment in its long, thorny journey toward Europe and the EU. This is “rump-Georgia,” following the 2008 loss of its regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia to Russia, and an “enhanced opportunities” associate member of NATO. Yet despite all of this, Georgia’s notoriously complicated politics continue to raise new obstacles to its EU accession. Although a vast majority supports EU membership, and the government at least pays lip service to this goal, Georgia’s EU candidate status (granted in December 2023) is now in question as the country approaches its existential parliamentary elections on October 26, a week after Moldova.
Everything might seem set for Georgia’s final accession to the EU, if not for the country’s strongman and billionaire, Bidzina Ivanishvili, leader of the Georgian Dream party, which has been in power for over a decade. In a sudden shift from earlier pledges to bring Georgia into the EU and recover Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ivanishvili in April accused the U.S. and the EU of meddling in Georgia’s internal affairs and pledged to reintroduce a “foreign agents” law that would criminalize NGOs receiving over 20% of their funding from abroad. In mid-August, the Georgian Dream campaign hinted that, if it retains a parliamentary majority of 113 or more seats in the October elections, it would ban all pro-Western opposition groups, including the United National Movement (UNM), formerly led by Mikheil Saakashvili. The campaign rhetoric has also become distinctly pro-Russian.
Thus, while the Georgian opposition represents a significant pro-European majority, they may be left with few options other than large-scale street demonstrations. Unsurprisingly, these developments have strained relations between Tbilisi and Brussels, with the EU growing increasingly concerned about Georgia’s future as a Western democracy and its partnership in resisting Russian aggression.
Therefore, for the EU and the West in general, the immediate and most pressing challenges in October may arise from pivotal moments in Moldova and Georgia—two key countries, along with Ukraine, in the policy of EU enlargement. Their turbulent but existentially important elections in late October will determine much about the region’s future. It is time for the “new” EU to prepare for the challenges ahead.
Michael Sahlin