1. The Global Consensus on Verification and Arms Control Eroded
It is regrettable that the consensus on the criticality of robust verification, established during the 1978 UN General Assembly special session, has been eroded over time. In addition, voices like Alva Myrdal in Sweden advocated for disarmament rather than arms control as early as the late 1970s, casting doubt on the nuclear powers’ sincerity in disarming.
The 1990s, however, witnessed substantial unilateral disarmament by the US concerning its land-based nuclear presence in Europe. At the same time, the reduction of the number of warheads after the end of the Cold War, particularly in the US arsenal, partially could of course be explained by the need for modernization. Quantity was to a certain extent to be replaced by quality in terms of precision etcetera. At this point, the notion that a nuclear disarmament process could proceed is a very complicated proposition. Russia can hardly expect to benefit from having retained a large stock of antiquated sub-strategic nuclear weapons should disarmament talks on that level again resume.
Efforts were made to develop verification systems not only for disarmament but also for arms control, exemplified by treaties like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran in 2015.
The assumptions underpinning arms control have evolved significantly since the early days of cooperation between Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev. Trust is no longer the foundation of verification, as famously quoted by Reagan from an old Russian proverb. The support for negotiations on confidence and security building measures have been seriously undercut. Henceforth, arms control, be it nuclear or conventional, must rely on stringent verification not based on confidence. A state facing a genuine invasion threat cannot afford to accept a treaty without verification unless it chooses to be defenseless.
2. The Noble Goal of Humanitarian Disarmament Compromised in the Process
The pursuit of humanitarian disarmament has suffered a setback due to the incongruent processes of TPNW advocacy and Russian aggression. The readiness to threaten the use nuclear sub-strategic weapons potentially being used for the first time since Hiroshima and Nagasaki contradicts the agreed statement among the P5 members of the Security Council that a nuclear war is unwinnable and must be avoided.
Academic discussions on these matters are further complicated if participants use the platform for campaigning rather than listening. The Harvard negotiating school’s objective of “negotiating by saying yes” has been overshadowed, with suspicions rising that confidence-building measures could be exploited to circumvent and surprise, potentially through hybrid warfare leveraging AI.
3. First Things First
In such a complex landscape, it is imperative to prioritize key concerns. For states like Sweden, the decision to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons was made through the accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons signed in 1968 and ratified in 1970. The devaluation of this commitment made by parties to the NPT, both by nuclear and non-nuclear powers, need to cease.
In Europe, the primary focus should be on preventing further escalation and broadening of conflicts. Ukraine must regain control over its territory, with agreements ensuring its territorial integrity and sovereignty adequately verified.
Simultaneously, the southern dimension of European security should not be neglected, a common oversight in northern and western Europe. The ongoing developments in the Middle East will necessitate some form of arms control as the two-state solution progresses. Notably, the Middle East witnessed the implementation of advanced arms control and verification systems in the 1970s and early 1980s. The issue of Iran is crucial for the NPT’s survival, emphasizing the need to address the hijacking of TPNW advocacy by certain Middle Eastern states, diverting attention from non-proliferation efforts and undermining NPT implementation.
4. Control and Verification
The task of providing a comprehensive overview of the subject matter for dissemination to the general populace in states like Sweden is a highly intricate endeavour. This complexity predates the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and even the annexation of Crimea and other regions of eastern Ukraine in 2014.
The rationale underpinning the developed message is closely tied to the chosen point of departure. It can be contended that the selected starting point significantly influences the objective of the message itself. If it is to condemn the possession and utilization of nuclear weapons, this approach typically leads to the dismissal of arguments centered on technical measures like verification and partial measures concerning arms control. Conversely, if the point of departure is the need for adequate verification, declaratory measures of arms control such as no first use or nuclear weapon free zones at sea have been rejected by NATO as was the case with regard to Warsaw Pact proposals during the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-building measures and Disarmament 1984-86. Principles relating to transparency and predictability have also been difficult to combine with the need for strategic ambiguity and different types of alert measures in crisis situations. The concept of strategic ambiguity currently has a primary role and the posture of several nuclear powers including the US.
5. The Importance of Crisis Communication
Against this backdrop, the Stockholm initiative for Nuclear Disarmament[1] was established in 2019 to enhance crisis communication. Drawing lessons from the 1973 October War, crisis communication systems were deemed essential to prevent inadvertent nuclear conflict during escalations on the conventional warfare front. This need is still all paramount importance and the Swedish initiative together with Germany and other countries should be pursued and promoted also in the NATO framework.
Lars-Erik Lundin
[1] Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament (no date) Regeringskansliet. Available at: https://www.government.se/government-policy/foreign-and-security-policy/stockholm-initiative-for-nuclear-disarmament/ (Accessed: 03 June 2024).