1. A Long Way to Go Before Verification Conditions for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World Will be Discussed
A world devoid of nuclear weapons arguably necessitates verification on an unprecedented scale,[1] a topic seldom broached in Sweden and numerous other states. The discourse on how to manage a nuclear weapon-free world has often been disregarded as inconsequential, with the assumption that once nuclear weapons vanish, all issues are resolved.
Notably, this aspect was not thoroughly scrutinized during the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) during the short time allotted for its negotiation. Swedish propositions in this realm lacked support from states willing to sign and ratify the treaty,[2] as well as from many civil society organizations advocating for the Treaty.
The issue of verifying nuclear disarmament was deferred by allowing the absence of nuclear weapon states from the treaty negotiation process.[3] It was widely believed that their disarmament would need to occur outside the treaty framework, possibly in bilateral or small group multilateral formats.
Most states transitioning from declarative support to actual signature and ratification of the treaty felt little threat from nuclear powers or were already encompassed within nuclear weapon-free zones with certain perceived safeguards via negative security assurances. The majority of these states lack a significant nuclear industry, except for Brazil, which has not ratified the treaty, or lack advanced security cooperation with a nuclear weapons state, except perhaps Kazakhstan.
However, achieving a nuclear weapon-free world necessitates preventing states and non-state actors worldwide from ever developing nuclear weapons again. Barring the theoretical scenario of a world government overseen by a functional Security Council, the alternative may be a single global superpower capable and willing to substantially reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons, akin to the discussions initiated by President Obama in Prague in 2009.[4]
Whether and whenever such a scenario would be a reality is truly up in the air.
2. Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament Also Need to be Carefully Analysed Before Verification Conditions can be Properly Assessed
A fundamental challenge in the current international system architecture is that nuclear arms control no longer can be effectively pursued solely within a bilateral framework involving the US and the Russian Federation. The likelihood of China seeking parity or superiority in terms of nuclear capabilities may have grown.[5] This reluctance on China’s part to engage in arms control negotiations until negotiating from a position of strength is possible complicates bilateral engagement between Russia and the US, even post a potential resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Arms control among nuclear-armed powers has become increasingly challenging, with states like the UK arguing the need to augment rather than reduce their nuclear arsenal even before 2022.
3. Safeguarding Non-Proliferation Through the NPT is Increasingly Challenging
Nuclear zero[6] remains vehemently opposed by all current nuclear powers and potentially by other nations contemplating the need for developing nuclear weapons, circumventing the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons may have significantly increased following Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, starting with the annexation of Crimea and subsequent actions in eastern Ukraine in 2014. The incentives for horizontal nuclear proliferation may have increased.
Ukraine, in practice, had adhered to many requirements akin to a state party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons had it existed before 2014. The country did not rely on nuclear deterrence against aggression from Russia or the West. The Russian aggression in 2014 revealed that the politically binding security assurances provided by the US and the UK through the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 were inadequate to deter the third signatory Russia. This inadequacy may have been aggravated by linguistic discrepancies between the English and Ukrainian versions of the security commitments.[7] The Ukraine Rada was presented a text including the concept of security guarantees whereas the English text spoke about security assurances. Even with legally binding security guarantees, it is widely deemed improbable that Washington or London would have risked their major cities in response to a nuclear threat against Kiev.
4. Increased Focus on Deterrence as a Means to Prevent Nuclear Conflict – or to Enable Aggression with Conventional Weapons
It is noteworthy that the concept of deterrence, once stigmatized during the TPNW advocacy process, now garners more support in Western Europe and parts of Asia than ever before. Both Sweden and Finland, post-February 24, 2022, have acknowledged, with near-unanimous parliamentary support, the necessity to bolster NATO deterrence as a nuclear alliance. The notion that the normative influence of the Treaty would sway nuclear weapons states to join now appears even more theoretical than before. The fact that the TPNW does not mandate accession to the NPT or the CTBT is now viewed as even more of a serious omission. Frequently Russia exploits the possibility through nucleus threats to deter the West from helping Ukraine.
Nuclear deterrence has emerged as the primary strategy to avert aggression against NATO member states, coupled with bolstered conventional defense capabilities. Similar considerations are being pondered by significant players in Asia and, to some extent, in the Middle East. States lacking protection from a nuclear-armed ally may contemplate acquiring nuclear weapons, disregarding their commitments under the NPT.
Lars-Erik Lundin
[1] Wohlstetter, A. (1976) Spreading the Bomb without Quite Breaking the Rules, JSTOR. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148025?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (Accessed: 09 August 2018).
[2] Statement. Available at: https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Sweden-Statement-TPNW-MSP-as-delivered.pdf (Accessed: 27 May 2024).
[3] Banning nuclear weapons without the nuclear armed states. Available at: https://article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Banning-without.pdf (Accessed: 27 May 2024).
[4] Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as delivered (no date) National Archives and Records Administration. Available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered (Accessed: 27 May 2024).
[5] Wolfsthal, J. (no date) Midcoastforum. Available at: https://www.midcoastforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2023_01_09_Wolfsthal.mp3 (Accessed: 28 May 2024).
[6] A world without nuclear weapons (2023) Global Zero. Available at: https://www.globalzero.org/index.html (Accessed: 27 May 2024).
[7] Soldatenko, M. (2023) Constructive ambiguity of the Budapest memorandum at 28: Making sense of the controversial agreement, Default. Available at: https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/constructive-ambiguity-of-the-budapest-memorandum-at-28-making-sense-of-the-controversial-agreement (Accessed: 27 May 2024).