NATO, NPT and the Budapest Memorandum from a Non-proliferation Perspective – Part 1
Much has been discussed and written regarding the heightened apprehensions concerning nuclear armaments within the framework of the Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine – the beginning of a new strategic era, arguably much less stable than earlier periods. The same sentiment applies to the potential escalation risks in the Middle East following the recent tragic events in Gaza and the confrontations between Iran and the Western powers. Furthermore, looming threats of escalation converge on the fate of Taiwan, with the US grappling with an increasingly antagonistic China.
Concurrently, numerous individuals, particularly in Europe, who previously hesitated to endorse the concept of deterrence before February 24, 2022, now emphatically emphasize the imperative to bolster deterrence measures to avert further escalations in and around Ukraine. In this context, it is undeniably tempting to overlook the broader perspective and refrain from establishing connections between disparate processes in what appears to be an increasingly chaotic, even anarchic, international system.
It is evident that these are pivotal issues of concern for the forthcoming NATO summit in Washington, where Sweden will partake as a member state for the first time. Subsequent to the summit, the candidates vying for the presidency of the US will need to address the international agenda, where the risk of a transactional and predominantly bilateral approach to international relations may gain precedence. In this milieu, there is a propensity to disregard the existence of still-relevant international treaties, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT and the remaining agreement pertaining to a partial test ban above ground. A retrospective glance at the John F. Kennedy administration in the early 1960s serves as a reminder of the profound concerns of the US at the time regarding the proliferation of nuclear armaments to numerous states worldwide, including Sweden. This prospect prompted the US to provide informal security reassurances to countries willing to sign and ratify the NPT. Had the United States, and by extension, the Soviet Union, refrained from this endeavour, the notion of superpower status for both nations might have been considerably more uncertain.
When deliberating on the relations between the US and Russia in the Ukrainian context or the relations between the US and China concerning Taiwan, it is imperative to consider this historical precedence. As Polina Sinovets, head of the Odessa Center for Non-proliferation (OdCNP) has astutely observed,[1] the popularity of nuclear armaments has surged due to the disregard for the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. Many states now perceive the necessity to fortify deterrence in the absence of clarity regarding US security guarantees and in light of perceived threats to the future existence of several regional powers, notably Iran. Hence, it is exceedingly crucial for NATO members to squarely focus on this threat.
Reinstating respect for the NPT will pose challenges, particularly due to the emergence of China as a potential future nuclear superpower, rendering arms control negotiations under Article 6 exceedingly arduous (see below). Arms control and disarmament are no longer solely matters for the US and Russia to address within the NPT framework. Neither party seems inclined to settle major issues until there is clarity regarding China’s intentions.
Disregarding the substantial strides made in verification during the preparation of the Iran deal approximately a decade ago may prove to be a catastrophic misstep. What benefits have been reaped from halting negotiations with Iran, especially considering the current trajectory where Iran is nearing the acquisition of nuclear armaments? Iran showcased the necessity for robust verification mechanisms, a facet not fully acknowledged by most signatories to the TPNW. The fact that nearly 100 member states of the UN General Assembly have signed and largely ratified a treaty lacking adequate verification provisions further complicates efforts to uphold international consensus on the pivotal paragraph agreed upon during the 1st special session on disarmament in 1978:
“Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should incorporate effective verification measures acceptable to all concerned parties to instil the requisite confidence and ensure compliance by all parties.”
SSOD 1 FINAL DOCUMENT 1978[2]
A broader examination of the prerequisites for a world devoid of nuclear armaments underscores the critical nature of this issue.
Lars-Erik Lundin
[1] The war in Ukraine and the future of Arms Control in Europe (2024) YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CKn0kAytL9s (Accessed: 29 May 2024).
[2] Special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (no date) United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Available at: https://disarmament.unoda.org/topics/ssod/ssod4-documents/ (Accessed: 28 May 2024).